



Security Framework for IP based Wireless Sensor Networks

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Dresden elektronik

dresden elektronik ingenieurtechnik GmbH

- founded: October 1990
- employees: approx. 90
- profile: hardware/software development
manufacturing
- location: Dresden, Saxony

Presenter

- name: Mike Ludwig
- position: team leader research
- profile: software and hardware design
for ultra low power devices and
wireless systems
more than 7 years of expertise
in wireless sensor networks






Content

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- Security architecture in wireless sensor networks
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
Wireless Sensor Networks Application Fields

- WSN have different protocols, applications and data
- there is no common way to secure data



Wireless Sensor Networks and Security


Common way is to secure inner WSN communication



- Drawback: Secure communication ends at WSN gateway
→ unsecure data transmission to business application

Wireless Sensor Networks and Security


Preferred Solution is to use end-to-end security



- Advantage: Secure communication between business application and WSN node.

Security Framework Concept


Our framework currently provides a hybrid approach:



- Advantage: resources for end-to-end security are required at the mediation layer which allows for many (unlimited) end-user components
- Drawback: not real end-to-end security (mitigated by a trusted mediation layer)

Security Framework Concept


- the framework defines different services (currently 10 different services)
(parameter transport, data transport, authentication, key management, threat detection, Over-the-Air Update, ...)
- each service uses a node and server module (individually configurable)
- each module can have its own security settings
(e.g. key management asymmetric authentication and symmetric encryption, OTAU uses integrity check only, ...)



- security can be selected within a wide range
 - no security
 - integrity check
 - symmetric encryption
 - integrity check and symmetric encryption
 - asymmetric authentication (integrity check)
 - asymmetric authentication (integrity check) and symmetric encryption

Security Framework Concept

- security is opaque to the application
- the framework stores all security information in Security Associations (SA) (one SA per module)




- all SA are established by the key establishment module
- all SA are managed by the key management module
- all SA are interpreted by a security provider (applies and checks the security)
- the application and the framework modules do not need to know about security at all



Security Framework node-side


- the framework is mostly communication stack independent
- a module communicates over some 'communication channel' with the corresponding module of the mediation layer
- what a 'communication channel' is defines the underlying communication stack

- ZigBee: endpoints
- IP: ports
- any other: ...



Security Framework server-side


- distributed mediation layer allows connection of WSN from many places
- internal communication is message based (easy transport over different mediums)



Security Framework – Packet Flow

Example for IP based communication:

- a packet arrives at the UDP layer
- the UDP layer hands it to Network Access Control (NAC)
- NAC gets the SA for the particular source address from Key Management and checks the access policy and validity (using the Security Provider)
- if the check succeeds the packet is passed on (for the module to receive)
- if the check fails Threat Detection is notified and the packet is dropped
- the receiving module gets the SA for the particular source address and module from Key Management and checks the security (using the Security Provider)
- if validation succeeds the data is processed by the module (and may given to the application)
- if validation fails Threat Detection is notified and the packet is dropped





Security Framework Module Overview

Authentication

authenticate a node against a Trust Center

Key Management

establishment and management of key

Parameter Manager

centralized configuration of node parameters

Data Aggregation

aggregation on router nodes and the gateway

NWK Access Control

establish security gates in WSN

Security Provider

responsible for ciphering and deciphering

Device Update


update device firmware

Threat Detection

detection of threats and alerting of operators

Security Framework – Authentication (AM)


- authenticate a node against a Trust Center
- first step after node joined the WSN
- based on PANA/EAP-PSK
- based on a pre-shared secret
- as result of an successful authentication a Master Session Key is derived



- mediation layer follows two paradigms:
 - reject messages from not authenticated nodes
 - forbid business application access to not authenticated nodes
- node follows the paradigm:
 - no communication without authentication

Security Framework – Parameter Manager (PM)


- centralized configuration of node parameters (second step after authentication)
- configures framework modules as well as node application



- allows registration of user/module parameter without itself knowing about the content (Strings, 8-Bit / 16-Bit Integers, ...)
- Mediation Layer stores parameters per node in database

Security Framework – Data Aggregation & Processing


- perform aggregation on router nodes and the gateway (devices always on)
- offer an interface to user application
- application sends (measurements) to and receives (commands) from the DAP
- user application does not care about security – done by framework
- user application does not care about aggregation – done by the framework



- aggregation can be runtime configure via the mediation layer
- configured aggregator node aggregates all data from any node

Security Framework – Network Access Control (NAC)

- establish security gates in WSN to stop malicious data as soon as possible
- each node can be configured at runtime to use NAC
- to make management simple (taking wireless routing into account) only the gateway can be chosen as enforcement point



- only legitimate nodes can send data past the gateway towards mediation layer





Security Framework – Security Provider (SP)

- responsible for security application and checking
- includes packet processing (in which order must security be applied when integrity check and encryption is defined)
- all modules rely on the SP for security
- only interprets the SA to process a packet
- a firmware update can update existing/introduce new algorithms

Group	Algorithm
Hash	MD5 / SHA1 / SHA224 / SHA256 / SHA384 / SHA512
HMAC	HMAC-MD5 / HMAC-SHA1 HMAC-SHA224 / HMAC-SHA256 HMAC-SHA384 / HMAC-SHA512
Symmetric Cipher	AES128-CBC / AES128-ECB / AES128-CCM AES192-CBC / AES192-ECB / AES192-CCM AES256-CBC / AES256-ECB / AES256-CCM
Asymmetric Cipher	ECDSA-NIST-P256 ECDSA-NIST-B283 ECDSA-NIST-K283

Security Framework – Security Provider (SP)


- all crypto operations are supported by resource constrained sensor nodes
- test with software and hardware accelerated crypto engines were done (8 bit AVR, 32 bit ARM7)
- also constrained sensor nodes can run software cryptography except ECDSA
- asymmetric cryptography can be used for data transport if a hardware accelerator is used



Results are shown for an 8 bit AVR at 16 MHz, 64 byte data packet

Security Framework Conclusion

What does the Security Framework provide?





Thank you for your attention!

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